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Introduction
What makes a star a star? Why are Madonna, Luciano Pavarotti or Tom
Cruise so immensely rich? The competitive model in its simple version tells
us that people are remunerated according to their (marginal) productivity.
This would imply that, given the enormous differences in income between
the average writer or actor and, say, Stephen King or Sean Connery, there
would have to be a huge gap between the talent of the stars and of those
that come next but do not enjoy a star status. If you agree with me that
Britney Spears’ talent is not hugely different from that of your local music
club’s singer, there must be more to the superstar phenomenon than the
simple competitive model would be able to portray.
This is what we investigate in three steps. The next section presents the
theoretical arguments, the third section discusses the empirical evidence for
the arts, and the last section points out some extensions. Although the
superstar phenomenon is not limited to the cultural sector – there are
superstar law firms, doctors, managers, professors and of course athletes –
the focus here is on superstars in the arts.
Theoretical concepts
In his seminal paper on ‘The Economics of Superstars’, Sherwin Rosen
explains how small differences in talent translate into large differences in
earnings. The underlying reason for that is the concurrence of imperfect
substitutability of different qualities (of the otherwise ‘same’ service) on the
demand side and a production technology that allows for joint consump-
tion. He starts by acknowledging that different qualities of a narrowly
defined service (for example, the performance of a particular Beethoven
concert) are imperfect substitutes in consumption: people rationally favour
fewer high-quality services rather than more of the same service at medio-
cre levels.1 That might be true for a number of services (such as medical ser-
vices) and this higher willingness to pay alone would lead to a difference in
pay. It already explains the convexity of the function that translates quality
into income.2 The enormous income differentials between superstars and
their colleagues of lesser talent, however, are only explained if the con-
sumption technology is taken into consideration. Public performances of,
say, a concert exhibit the characteristics of a club good – unit costs decrease
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with rising audience size, although there will be congestion costs at some
point as a classical live concert is more enjoyable in a medium-sized concert
hall than in a football stadium. These congestion costs put a limit on the
optimal size of audiences and therefore lead to non-degenerate market
equilibria (more than one supplier). Still, artists of higher quality
command higher prices and a greater audience and thus larger income.
Congestion is absent for ‘canned performances’ such as CD productions,
TV performances, books, videos or movies. In Rosen’s set-up, this leads to
a single artist (or single group of artists) – the best – to serve the whole
market. Potential market entry limits the market power of the artist, but
since she is perceptibly better than the one second to her she enjoys an eco-
nomic rent which leads to a higher price than her closest competitor would
need to charge to enter the market. This quality difference can be small,
although it needs to be perceptible, but it is leveraged through the scale
economies in production and can make total rent very large in equilibrium.
Rosen has put forward a powerful idea in a simple model; given the beau-
tiful simplicity of his arguments he has left many important aspects for
others to explore. He deliberately disregarded product differentiation as he
defined his competitive market very narrowly and did not adopt a monop-
olistic competition model à la Lancaster or Dixit–Stiglitz.3 There are far
more than only two or three movie superstars of each gender or a handful
of superstar rock’n’roll bands, as his model would predict: heterogeneous
tastes or a love of variety become an important limitation to star power, in
addition to the threat of entry of close competitors. Moreover, he did not
explain why people prefer a single superstar performance to a series of per-
formances of lesser quality, but rather assumed it. Lastly, he did not explain
the emergence of superstars, but rather assumed a given and observable dis-
tribution in quality among artists. Adler (1985) and MacDonald (1988)
filled some of the gaps.
MacDonald (1988) provides a dynamic version of Rosen’s model. In a
two-period stochastic model, performers decide whether to perform and if
they do the quality of their performance (either good or bad) is observable
to all interested. Since outcomes are serially correlated for each artist, first-
period reviews have predictive power for the second period’s performance.
This accumulation of knowledge leads to a separation of market segments
in the steady state: those with bad first-period reviews leave the business for
an exogenous alternative occupation while those with a good first-period
performance command a larger crowd and a higher price than the newcom-
ers, because consumers face a much smaller risk with regard to the perfor-
mance quality and are willing to pay for this. These artists experience a vast
income growth compared to their first-period income – they rise to become
stars.
432 A handbook of cultural economics
In his article, ‘Stardom and Talent’, Moshe Adler describes a learning
process as the key to understanding the superstar phenomenon. Learning
about art is so important because art consumption is positively addictive in
that marginal utility from art consumption increases with the ability to
appreciate art, which is a function of past art consumption (Stigler and
Becker, 1977): the more you know, the more you appreciate it. In the course
of consuming art ‘consumption capital’ is accumulated and thus marginal
utility from art consumption rises over time.4 This learning process does not
refer to art in general but to specific art forms and even artists. Artist-
specific consumption capital is built up by consuming the art service pro-
vided by the artist in question and by discussing it with others likewise
knowledgeable about this artist. The latter effect creates positive network
externalities as it is costly to search for someone to interact with about a
specific artist.5 This explains the existence of stars: stars may be born
because initially (slightly) more people happen to know one artist than any
other artists of possibly equal talent and communicate about him or her
more with others. Artist-specific consumption capital is built up more
rapidly, and this artist will snowball into a star.
Empirical evidence
Hamlen (1991, 1994) tries to single out a superstar effect in the American
record industry using a sample of 115 singers for the years 1955–87. Since
the superstar phenomenon in the Rosen (1981) sense requires that ‘small
differences in talent become magnified in large earnings differences, with
greater magnification of the earnings–talent gradient increasing sharply
near the top of the scale’ (p.846), an empirical analysis requires a quantifi-
able concept of ‘talent’. Hamlen uses data on the harmonic content of voice,
a concept taken from the technical literature on voice, that measures ‘depth’
and ‘richness’ (for details, see Hamlen, 1991, p.731). He runs the total
record sales (Hamlen, 1991) and number of hit singles and hit albums
(Hamlen, 1994) on the measure of quality and other singers’ attributes such
as the year in which the singer first released a single or album, dummies
for sex, race (black/non-black), whether the artists write their own songs,
whether they have appeared in a movie, and whether they have a recognized
band. In his second paper he incorporates the fact that success in the ‘low-
end’ singles market may serve as a signalling device for quality that feeds
into consumers’ choices in the ‘top-end’ albums market.6
Although talent, measured by voice quality, increases sales Hamlen
(1991, 1994) fails to find a magnification effect. Rewards for talent are far
less than proportional to differences in talent. Hence he cannot identify
a superstar phenomenon in the Rosen sense. Furthermore, the low-end
singles market functions as a quality filter for the albums market, which is
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in line with MacDonald’s idea of a multi-period information accumulation
process. While voice quality is important in the singles market it is less so
in the albums market, in which success in the singles market serves as a
quality indicator. Other singers’ attributes apart from voice quality, such as
sex, race, appearances in movies, and a good band, influence success as well.
That already indicates that there is more to success than just talent.
Chung and Cox (1994) show that the distribution of gold records in the
period 1958–89 follows the specific Yule distribution f (i)1/i(i1),
f (i)1 where f (i) is the share of performers which have earned i gold
records (i1, . . ., ∞). Yule distributions in general have been shown to
describe a variety of sociological, biological and economic phenomena
such as the distribution of incomes by size, of cities by population, of sci-
entists by the number of papers and so on. The underlying probability
process can be described as a sequential buying process: one consumer after
the other buys one record first, then in the second round each consumer
buys a different record and so forth. The choice of records in each round
follows two assumptions: (i) the probability that consumer k1 buys a
record that has been chosen by exactly i of the k previous consumers is pro-
portional to i; (ii) there is a constant small probability that consumer k1
chooses a record that has not been chosen previously. Assumption (ii) rep-
resents a snowball effect in the sense of Adler (1985). The fact that the
observed distribution of gold records coincides with a pattern that results
from a stochastic process which incorporates such a snowball effect leads
the authors to conclude that the superstardom phenomenon is merely the
result of a probability mechanism which predicts that ‘artistic outputs will
be concentrated among a few lucky individuals’ (Chung and Cox, 1994,
p.771, emphasis in original). Difference in talent is not necessary for super-
stars to emerge, but rather luck that initially increases the user base and
reinforces itself. This supports Adler’s idea of the emergence of superstars.
Both empirical approaches fail to provide conclusive evidence for the
superstar phenomenon. In the Hamlen approach it is by no means clear
that the harmonic content of voice is the relevant measure for artistic quality
for singers of non-classical music (rock, folk and so on). Charm, sex-
appeal, the contents of the lyrics and the show on the stage are also very
important factors for success for singers,7 yet they are very difficult to
measure. Thus Hamlen’s approach suffers from an omitted variable bias.
Chung and Cox’s coincidence result does not tell us anything about the
underlying reason for the selection of consumers; the fact that the outcome
is consistent with a pure reinforcing probability mechanism does not
strictly prove it is at work. The observed outcome could also be explained
by a preference for what consumers regard as the highest quality coupled
with a certain preference for variety and somewhat heterogeneous tastes.
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(Possible) extensions
Superstars are not limited to the arts, but play an important role in sports
and other areas. The empirical problems described above are not as serious
in sports, since quality is easier to measure. ‘Soft skill’ like charm, looks or
lyrics play a less important role; performance is measurable in inches, milli-
seconds or goals. Therefore empirical analyses of the superstar phenome-
non in sports are more promising.
Adler’s idea of the importance of individuals’ interaction for the acqui-
sition of artist-specific consumption capital and MacDonald’s idea of an
information accumulation process point towards the important role of the
mass media for the acquisition of information and thus consumption
capital. It should be incorporated in empirical analyses. Lehmann and
Schulze (2003) combine these two aspects by looking at the role of the mass
media for superstars in soccer.
Ruth Towse (1992) analyses the role that intermediaries play for super-
star singers in classical music by reducing search and information costs of
opera houses. In this market, the honorarium serves as a signal for quality
and popularity and thus its reduction would not increase the demand for
the singer. Other extensions look at the role of superstar museums and the
consequences for museum policy (Frey, 2000, ch. 4) and efficiency conse-
quences of the existence of superstars (Richter and Schneider, 1999).8
Notes
1. As a convenient modelling trick he assumes that utility derived from this particular
service y is the product of quantity n and quality per unit of output z, yn z, thereby
adopting a smooth quantity–quality substitution technology (comparable to the concept
of labour in efficiency units). This allows him to use a competitive framework for the
single market for y instead of modelling monopolistic competition in products of differ-
ent quality. Imperfect substitutability is introduced through a fixed cost of consumption
per unit of quantity, which gives rise to a preference of cost-minimizing consumers for
fewer services of high quality (instead of more services of less quality) as this reduces the
fixed costs. See Hamlen (1994) for a Dixit–Stiglitz model of artistic variety.
2. Rosen (1981, p.846) writes: ‘Hearing a succession of mediocre singers does not add up to
a single outstanding performance. If a surgeon is 10 percent more successful in saving lives
than his fellows, most people would be willing to pay more than 10 percent premium for
his services.’
3. See fn. 1 in Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1983) on this.
4. The idea goes back to Alfred Marshall, who wrote, ‘It is therefore no exception to the law
[of diminishing marginal utility] that the more good music a man hears, the stronger is
his taste for it likely to become’ (Marshall, 1962, p.94). There is substantial empirical evi-
dence for such an addictive effect; see, for example, Smith (1998).
5. The mechanism is very similar to positive network externalities for the usage of word pro-
cessors and other computer programs, which are more valuable the larger the user base –
exchange of files, recommendations and trouble shooting become easier the larger the
group of people that share the same software.
6. Publication of singles typically precedes publication in the album market (although estab-
lished stars sometimes go back to the singles market).
7. The success of Bob Dylan, who is not renowned for his harmonic voice, or that of Britney
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Spears, The Spice Girls or AC/DC, and many others are evidence that there is more to a
singer’s success than just a beautiful voice.
8. See also Bonus and Ronte (1997).
See also:
Chapter 7: Artists’ labour markets; Chapter 18: Criticism in the arts; Chapter 25: Demand;
Chapter 56: Taste formation.
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